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Chapter #: The contested call for ‘what works’ education research: the Nature of 






The chapter draws parallels between Grosseteste’s comments on the anima mundi and 
contemporary calls for education research to become more evidence informed. The chapter 
challenges the common interpretation of Grosseteste’s commentary on the anima mundi 
placing it in a wider philosophical debate over the ‘nature of Nature’. It is suggested that 
Grosseteste’s reluctance to fully renounce the concept of the anima mundi gives an insight 
into the contemporary debate within education over the desirability of ‘what works’ 
approaches to research. As Nature understood as animated by a ‘world soul’ is resistant to 
description through natural scientific methods, so education research should resist ‘what 
works’ approaches in favour of a research methodology, informed by complexity theory, that 





The contested call for ‘what works’ education research: the Nature of contemporary 
education research discourses and Grosseteste’s views on the anima mundi 
Dr Adam Hounslow-Eyre 
 
This chapter will draw parallels between Robert Grosseteste’s nuanced consideration of 
celestial animation and current debates in education research. It will be argued that the 
increasingly contested call for education research to become more ‘evidence-based’ and 
increasingly able to identify ‘what works’ at both policy level and in day to day teaching 
practice can be illuminated by an examination of Grosseteste’s consideration of the anima 
mundi (or ‘world soul’). The development of Grosseteste’s thinking on the anima mundi can 
be characterised as the progress towards an un-animated conception of the cosmos (McEvoy, 
1986; Dales, 1980) under the weight of patristic theology and anti-Aristotelianism. This 
perspective will be contrasted with the contemporary controversy over the rise of ‘what 
works’ education research, which itself is asserted under the weight of its own ‘patrician call’ 
for the methods of natural scientific research to be adopted by education researchers. 
However, the common characterisation of Grosseteste’s thought on the anima mundi will also 
be challenged, arguing for a more nuanced understanding that will add further insight into 
both his thinking and contemporary debates within education research. Both Grosseteste’s 
seeming resistance to fully renounce a conception of the cosmos as animated by an anima 
mundi and the resistance by contemporary education researchers to ‘what works’ approaches 
will be characterised as a principled opposition (using Collingwood’s term) to the 
‘disenchantment’ of Nature in the name of a ‘sophisticated realism’. 
The discussion will proceed through four parts; part one details the ‘paradigm (or science) 
wars’ that frame contemporary debates within education research over the desirability of 
more evidence informed approaches; drawing on the work of Alan Bryman. Part two reviews 
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Grosseteste’s comments on the anima mundi making connections to both the paradigm wars 
and ‘what works’ approaches to education research. Through Part two it is also argued that 
the common interpretation of Grosseteste’s comments on the anima mundi (ascribed to 
McEvoy and Dales) can be challenged by a contrasting interpretation drawing on a historical 
chronology of critical thought from the work of Francis Stevenson, Christina Van Dyke and 
Jack Cunningham. Part three offers an analysis of historical conceptions of Nature, drawing 
on the work of Robin Collingwood and Werner Stark to argue that a clear understanding of 
historical conceptions of the Nature of reality and its ‘disenchantment’ is essential to enable a 
critique of ‘what works’ approaches to educational research that would accord with 
Grosseteste’s nuanced thinking on the anima mundi. Finally, part four brings together the 
critique of evidence-based approaches to education research with Grosseteste’s concept of the 
anima mundi drawing out how his thinking has contemporary relevance and might highlight 
future developments in education research drawing on complexity theory. 
Part One: The Paradigm (or Science) Wars 
The term ‘paradigm war’ is not easy to delineate, with conflict over which paradigms are 
involved, the terms used to characterise the warring parties, the start and end dates of the 
conflict, and indeed if hostilities have ceased (Bryman 2012). As an initial characterisation 
Bryman (2012) argues that the source of the conflict through the 1980s and 1990s was over 
the merits and assumptions of quantitative and qualitative research; the type of ‘science’ that 
is most ‘valuable’. The term paradigm in this context (though again definitions are contested) 
is a broad concept drawing on the work of Thomas Kuhn (1996), where a paradigm is a set of 
common assumptions, models and beliefs about how research problems should be understood 
and addressed. Bryman (2012) offers an insightful overview of the progress and positions 
implicit in the paradigm wars arguing that they centred on the contrasting ‘epistemological’ 
and ‘ontological’ positions that characterize quantitative and qualitative research. 
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Epistemology is the branch of philosophical theory that studies what knowledge is and how it 
is possible. The word 'epistemology' comes from the ancient Greek episteme, meaning 
'knowledge' and the suffix olog meaning 'the science of' or 'the study of.' So, literally 
speaking, epistemology is the study or investigation of knowledge itself. Epistemological 
enquiry is not about what we know, but about what it means to know. In contrast ontology is 
the branch of philosophical theory that studies ‘being’; what kind of entities exist, the 
structure(s) of physical reality. The word comes from the ancient Greek onto, meaning 
‘being’ or ‘that which is’. The possibility of an anima mundi, the debate over whether the 
cosmos is animated or not might be seen then as an ontological question. Bryman (2012) 
attempts to further explain the issues at the heart of the paradigm wars by considering the 
range of positions at both the epistemological and ontological level. 
At the epistemological level there is a debate over the desirability of a natural scientific 
programme for social research, as against one that eschews scientific pretensions and the 
search for general and universal laws and instead emphasizes humans as engaged in constant 
interpretation of their environments within specific contexts. For Bryman (2012) this contrast 
is one that is frequently drawn up in terms of a battle between positivist philosophical 
principles and interpretivist ones. Bryman continues that at the ontological level, there is a 
contrast between a belief that there is a social realm waiting to be uncovered by the social 
researcher which exists externally to actors and on the other hand a domain that is in a 
continuous process of creation and recreation by its participants. For Bryman (2012) this 






Figure 1: Diagram showing Bryman’s analysis of the paradigm wars at ontological and 
epistemological levels 
Epistemological Level 
Interpretivist  Positivist 
Social Scientific 
Interpretation of specific 
contexts 
 Natural scientific 
General and universal laws 
   
Constructionist  Objectivist 
Social realm continuously 
created and recreated by 
participants 
 Social realm akin to physical 
realm – external to actors 
Ontological Level 
 
For the discussion through later parts of this chapter it is important to highlight how 
Bryman’s analysis of the paradigm wars permits a concept of ‘dynamism’ in constructionist 
ontology and interpretivist epistemology. Constructionist ontology is ‘dynamic’ (in contrast 
to objectivist ontology) in that there is continuous creation and recreation of the structures of 
physical reality by participants. This results in a dynamic interpretivist epistemology (in 
contrast to positivist epistemology) that is an interpretation of specific contexts that 
ceaselessly change. 
Having set out an initial characterisation of the paradigm wars Bryman (2012) recognises that 
the debate is deeply philosophical in character and warns that a range of alternative synonyms 
are used by ‘combatants’ to characterise what is at the heart of the contest. Bryman also 
warns that the nomenclature of a ‘paradigm’ war may be extremely unhelpful, allowing all 
participants to assume complete incompatibility between their viewpoints. Bryman’s insight 
is perhaps captured most succinctly by Bruce Robbins (1998) assertion that participants in the 
conflict are marked by their use of “synecdochic rhetoric”. Synecdochic rhetoric attempts to 
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make the part stand for, and condemn, the whole; for instance a theorist in the positivist and 
objectivist camp will identify an aspect of qualitative social scientific research which they 
can ‘demonstrate’ is unsound or misguided and from this dismiss all qualitative research (the 
‘Sokal hoax’, in which physicist Alan Sokal successfully had a spoof article published in a 
cultural studies journal, can be viewed as an example of this). Bryman (2012) is concerned 
that rather than assuming a position in one warring camp in the paradigm wars and deploying 
synecdochic rhetoric to gain victory, a more sophisticated perspective is required. A 
sophisticated perspective that might allow the warring parties to reach a détente, or perhaps 
better, allow all parties to move forward ceasing continual skirmishes. The central argument 
of the current chapter is that such a perspective that can be illuminated by Grosseteste’s 
commentary on the anima mundi. 
Paradigm Wars and Contemporary Education Research 
The protests of the warring factions in the paradigm wars, with quantitative research typically 
been associated with a positivist and objectivist stance common to the natural sciences, and 
qualitative research been associated with an interpretivist and constructionist stance common 
to the social sciences and humanities, frames much of the debate over the quality and 
relevance of educational research. A call for a more ‘rigorous’, ‘what works’, positivistic and 
objectivist approach to educational research (exemplified by the practice of the ‘gold 
standard’ of Randomised Control Trials) has become widespread and dominant (Furlong 
2004, 346). 
Calls for education to becomes more evidenced-based have a long history (Hillage Report 
1998; Tooley and Darby 1998; Oakley 2006; Slavin 2002). More recently, this call for 
evidenced-based policy and teaching has centred around data rich practices such as the 
increasing use of Systematic Review (SR) and Randomised Control Trials (RCTs). Within 
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educational research the use of SR is exemplified by the meta-analysis of Hattie (2009) and 
in England by the work of the Education Endowment Foundation which also funds RCTs.  
The suggestion that the advocacy of ‘what works’ education research is ‘contested’ as in the 
title of this chapter might seem strange in the contemporary context when, as Yong Zhao 
argues, ‘proponents of RCTs have won the day, at least for now’ (2017, 2). The emergence of 
the ‘gold standard’ status for RCTs in education research has increasingly suppressed interest 
(and funding) for more qualitative education research and has been characterised by several 
thinkers (Millar et al 2002, 29; Lather 2004, 762) as a continuation of the paradigm (or 
science) wars of the 1980s. Ryohei Matsushita goes further by locating the current emphasis 
on evidence-based education research in a longer historical and philosophical tradition: 
 
The clash between the promoters and the critics of evidence-based education can also 
be said to reflect the clash of academic traditions, from research methodology on. 
That is, it originates in the classic conflict of theoria, which pursues something which 
will be appropriate at any time or place, and praxis, which handles individual 
situations case-by-case according to differing specific realities: the conflicts of 
positivism vs. hermeneutics or reductionism vs. holism typically represented by 
science versus the humanities. 
(Matsushita 2017, 105) 
 
As Bryman (2012) suggests it is common for a range of terms to be employed to characterise 
the warring parties in the paradigm wars. Here Matsushita aligns Bryman’s quantitative, 
positivist and objectivist perspectives with theoria and qualitative, interpretivist and 





Figure 2: Diagram showing Bryman’s analysis of the paradigm wars at ontological and 
epistemological levels incorporating Matsushita’s terminology 
 Epistemological Level 
 Interpretivist  Positivist 
Bryman Social Scientific 
Interpretation of specific 
contexts 
 Natural scientific 
General and universal laws 
 Praxis  Theoria 
Matsushita Case-by-case according to 
specific realities – 
hermeneutics, holism 
 Appropriate at any time or 
place – positivism, 
reductionism 
 Constructionist  Objectivist 
Bryman Social realm continuously 
created and recreated by 
participants 
 Social realm akin to physical 
realm – external to actors 
 Ontological Level 
 
Matsushita’s (2017) setting of the debate over evidence-based approaches to education 
research in a long philosophical tradition (which he attempts to capture through a variety of 
binary oppositions) highlights a possible further philosophical opposition with a long history; 
that between ‘realism’ and ‘nominalism’. This opposition is often termed the ‘problem of 
universals’ and can be seen as a central concern of both the ‘paradigm wars’ and the 
contested call for ‘what works’ education research. Robert Orton (1995) suggests a universal 
is any noun (excluding a proper noun) that is used to refer to a number of particular instances 
of something that shares common characteristics; for instance the noun tiger is a universal 
used to describe any number of large, striped, sharp-toothed meat eaters that live in China, 
India, or the zoo (Orton 1995, 212). The problem of universals centres around where the 
common characteristic of the named phenomenon ‘resides’. With great clarity Orton suggests 
that the history of philosophy is marked by three broad perspectives on where the 
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commonality of a universal resides; in the world (the realist perspective), in language (the 
nominalist perspective) or in the mind (the ‘conceptualist’ perspective) (Orton 1995, 212).  
Orton suggests the Platonic ‘theory of forms’ as an example of a realist perception of 
universals; in some sense universals exist ‘before’ (or ante res) particular instances of the 
phenomenon. In contrast to this Aristotelian thought moves away from a realist (in the world) 
perception of universals to a more nominalist (language based, in res) perception of 
universals. Orton’s analysis of the problems of universals is particularly useful as it allows 
clear links to be made between the paradigm wars (the conflict of theoria and praxis) and 
‘what works’ education research. The science wars pits theoria with a perception of the 
universal in a realist (ante res / in the world) sense against praxis with a perception of the 
universal in a nominalist (in res / in language) sense. The outcome of the science wars in 
Orton’s terms was a conceptualist détente, the ‘attempt to negotiate a truce between the 
nominalists and the realists. [Conceptualists] argue, roughly, that a universal term is more 
than a linguistic convention but less than an independently existing entity or essence.’ [post 




Figure 3: Diagram showing Bryman’s analysis of the paradigm wars incorporating 
Matsushita and Orton’s conceptualization of the problem of universals.  
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Within education research this conceptualist détente is currently under renewed pressure from 
the rise of ‘what works’ approaches which advocate for a more theoria, realist (ante res) 
conception of research. This perspective is clearly stated in the work of Ben Goldacre a 
doctor of medicine and campaigner in unpicking the misuse of science and statistics by 
journalists and politicians. In his work commissioned by the Department for Education to 
advocate for the increased use of RCTs in education research Goldacre argues: 
 
I think there is a huge prize waiting to be claimed by teachers. By collecting better 
evidence about what works best, and establishing a culture where this evidence is 
used as a matter of routine, we can improve outcomes for children, and increase 
professional independence. Every child is different, of course, and every patient is 
different too; but we are all similar enough that research can help find out which 
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interventions will work best overall, and which strategies should be tried first, second 
or third, to help everyone achieve the best outcome. 
(Goldacre 2013, 7) 
 
The universalising impetus of theoria in the context of ‘what works’ education research is a 
‘huge prize’ but also the basis of the contestation of the preceding conceptualist détente to the 
paradigm wars. The day to day praxis of educational professionals militates against a view of 
education research as uncovering evidence which will be appropriate at any time or place; the 
‘patrician call’ to embrace the methods of natural science in education research.  
Deborah Osberg, Gert Biesta and Paul Cilliers (2008) are representative of researchers who 
are both critical of the advocacy of theoria, ‘what works’ education research and explicitly 
engage with a consideration of ontology and epistemology. Their thought draws on 
complexity theory to argue for an ‘emergentist epistemology’: 
 
With complexity we suggest that ‘knowledge’ [epistemology] and ‘the world’ 
[ontology] should not be understood as separate systems which somehow have to be 
brought into alignment with each other, but that they are part of the same evolving 
complex system. 
(Osberg et al 2008, 214) 
 
For Osberg et al (2008) complexity theory ‘crucially’ introduces a ‘notion of time’ into the 
relationship between ‘knowledge and reality’. This temporal dimension is the ‘dynamic’ 
dimension previously discussed with reference to Bryman’s initial characterisation of the 
paradigm wars and developed through the figures presented above. It is argued that Osberg et 
al (2008) explicitly draw on the constructionist and interpretivist positions discussed and 
argue for an emergentist epistemology that recognises praxis in a specific context over time. 
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Rather…than thinking of knowledge as the representation of a world that is 
somewhere present in itself, our considerations suggest an ‘emergentist’ epistemology 
in which knowledge reaches us not as something we receive but as a response, which 
brings forth new worlds because it necessarily adds something (which was not present 
anywhere before it appeared) to what came before. 
(Osberg et al 2008, 226) 
 
It is such contemporary contestation in education research that can be illuminated by an 
engagement with Grosseteste’s comments on the anima mundi (and the ‘disenchantment’ of 
Nature). Part two explores and challenges the common characterisation of the progress of 
Grosseteste’s thinking on the anima mundi as towards an un-animated conception; in the 
terms of this part as a progress from praxis to theoria. 
Part Two: Grosseteste and the Anima Mundi 
McEvoy (1986) offers a comprehensive overview of Grosseteste’s comments on the anima 
mundi; suggesting that he makes eight references to the concept through his writings. 
McEvoy goes on to detail a development in Grosseteste’s thinking from the notion of a single 
anima mundi (De sphaera) to a plurality of celestial souls (De motu corporali and De motu 
supercaelesti) to an eventual rejection of (or silence on) its possibility (De operationibus 
solis). In De sphaera, McEvoy tells us that Grosseteste views the anima mundi as the 
efficient cause of the diurnal motion of the heavens, as an agent that brings a thing into being 
or initiates a change; comparable to the efficient cause of a table being a carpenter. The 
movement of the planets is effected by the operation of the anima mundi; this concept is 
perhaps dangerously ‘enchanted’ in relation to Aquinas’ view of God as a first, efficient 
cause. 
For McEvoy, Grosseteste’s conception of the anima mundi develops by the time of De motu 
corporali and De motu supercaelesti where his view is now more analogous to a Platonic 
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notion of a ‘moving soul’ or the Aristotelian conception of an ‘unmoved mover’, with the 
heavenly bodies being animate but not sensate. (In the terms of part three the cosmos, Nature 
is increasingly seen as disenchanted and mechanical). McEvoy suggests that by the time of 
Exiit edictum Grosseteste’s views have developed still further with the hypothesis of the 
anima mundi being deliberately wide, to include the speculations of Plato, Aristotle and 
Avicenna; but also more speculative with the assertion that the heavens may be animate ‘as 
certain philosophers maintain’. By the writing De operationibus solis Grosseteste’s 
acknowledgement of the speculative nature of the anima mundi is more complete where 
‘beyond subjunctives he [Grosseteste] is not prepared to go’ (McEvoy, 1986 376). As 
McEvoy highlights, Grosseteste more moderately claims that ‘certain philosophers’ postulate 
a living principle of heavenly motion; a claim that he no longer expresses to hold himself. For 
McEvoy, Grosseteste’s flirtation with the anima mundi is finally at an end by the time of 
Hexaemeron where he acknowledges that there is no scriptural support for the animation 
hypothesis. 
However, the movement of Grosseteste’s thinking to a rejection of the anima mundi might be 
characterised as less complete than McEvoy asserts, as Grosseteste writes: 
 
Since on this subject of the nature of the heavens, and of the movers of the heavens, 
and of the moving powers they have, so many philosophers and authorities have given 
so many and such uncertain opinions, what can I do except admit and bewail my own 
ignorance on the point? 
Chapter VIII 
1. I am not ashamed to admit my ignorance about the number of the heavens, and 
about their movements, even though I could tell you a large number of views from the 
astronomers as well as from the natural philosophers. I do not know how to show up 
any of them as liars, or show them forth as telling the truth, since they have left us 
nothing but ambiguity. 




Grosseteste’s ‘ignorance’ on this point might be regarded as more significant than McEvoy’s 
interpretation gives credit. Francis Seymour Stevenson’s (1899) interpretation of 
Grosseteste’s thought as ‘sophisticated realism’ can be fruitfully utilised to further explore 
this ambiguity over the anima mundi in the context of the wider realist and nominalist debate. 
Stevenson suggests that Grosseteste’s contribution to the ‘debate over Universals’ might be 
regarded as a ‘sophisticated realist’ position which views Universals as simultaneously ‘ante 
res’, ‘in res’ and ‘post res’ ‘according to the point of view’ (Stevenson 1899, 42). In 
Stevenson’s interpretation of Grosseteste, Universals are ‘ante res in the mind of the Creator, 
expressed ‘in res’ in the phenomenal world and reconstructed ‘post res’ in the mind of the 
thinker by induction and abstraction. This interpretation of Grosseteste’s thought on the 
problem of Universals gives an insight as to why he may have been unwilling to completely 
renounce the anima mundi. This description of epistemology is ‘vital’ (living and animate) 
and ‘dynamic’; in the context of the paradigm wars it is a position closer to a qualitative and 
interpretivist epistemology drawing from a constructionist ontology. There is a sense of 
praxis at the heart of Grosseteste’s thinking. Stevenson’s interpretation suggests 
Grosseteste’s engagement with Aristotelian nominalism results in a sophisticated 
epistemological position that is trying to unify nominalism with the realist sense of 
Augustinian ‘divine illumination’ which itself draws on the Platonic theory of forms. A 
similar argument has been proposed more recently in the work of Van Dyke. 
Van Dyke (2009) argues that scholarship on Grosseteste’s opinions concerning Augustinian 
illumination and Aristotelian nominalist epistemology in the Commentary on the Posterior 
Analytics tends to fall into two distinct camps; with one camp (exemplified for Van Dyke by 
McEvoy) arguing that Grosseteste does not hold the Aristotelian account on which he 
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comments, while the other camp (exemplified for Van Dyke by Marrone) argues that 
Grosseteste’s exposure to the Posterior Analytics leads him to abandon completely a theory 
of divine illumination. However, for Van Dyke: 
 
I believe, in contrast, that Grosseteste quite consciously attempts to embed the ‘new’ 
epistemology of the Posterior Analytics within an account of divine illumination, and 
that he himself thought he had successfully reconciled the Augustinian and 
Aristotelian views.’ 
(Van Dyke 2009, 686) 
 
Or in Stevenson’s terms: 
 
[Grosseteste’s] influence was distinctly on the side of Realism as against Nominalism; 
but it was a realism which differed widely from the crude system of thought with 
which William de Champeaux had been identified, and which ascribed to universal 
notions an ‘objective reality’. 
(Stevenson 1899, 42) 
 
Cunningham (2018) adds further weight to the suggestion that the common 
characterisation of the progress of Grosseteste’s thought on the anima mundi should not 
be revised. He interprets the development in Grosseteste’s thinking not as ‘growing 
orthodoxy and final capitulation to Catholic consensus’ (Cunningham 2018, 81) but rather 
the product of an original, searching mind and suggests that there are two aspects to the 
increasing aversion to the anima mundi in Christian theological discussion more broadly. 
The first was that a conception of a living cosmos would lead to an idolatrous assertion of 
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its divinity. Secondly, the suggestion of God indwelling in the universe undermined the 
growing Christian understanding of a creator who transcended the natural order. In this 
context, Grosseteste’s resistance to completely abandoning the concept of the anima 
mundi is even more striking. In the terms of contemporary debate within education 
research it is possible to see some researchers with similarly searching minds willing to 
commit the idolatry of eschewing the pretentions of natural science by insisting on a more 
animated, emergent and sophisticated realist conception of education research. 
To be more precise, utilising the discussion from part one, Grosseteste can be interpreted as 
offering a solution to the problem of Universals that accords with Orton’s conceptualist 
account. This conceptualist account entails a vital and dynamic sense of ontology, an 
ontology of an animated cosmos and an anima mundi. In terms of education research there is 
currently debate between a ‘what works’ approach that offers a ‘crude system’ (to use 
Stevenson’s term) of positivistic, theoria realism opposed by a more interpretivist and 
conceptualist account that might seek inspiration from Grosseteste’s comments on the anima 
mundi. 
The significance of this animated ontology, that resists the disenchantment of Nature, is 
explored at length through the next part. 
Part Three: Nature and its Disenchantment 
This part revisits and extends discussion of the philosophical underpinnings of 
epistemological and ontological positions mentioned above in respect to the paradigm wars 
(part one). A very broad framework of analysis will be developed and advocated for to 




This broad framework draws on the work of Collingwood and Stark. The notion of the 
‘epistemic fallacy’, from Roy Bhaskar, is used as a bridge from the preceding discussion of 
the ontological and epistemological positions implicit in the paradigm wars to contemporary 
debates over ‘what works’ approaches to education research. 
Bhaskar is widely cited as the founder of the ‘critical realist’ methodology (Bhaskar and 
Hartwig 2010). A central concept is Bhaskar’s claim of an ‘epistemic fallacy’ (1997). 
Bhaskar states the epistemic fallacy as the erroneous belief that questions of ontology are 
reducible to questions of epistemology. Bhaskar asserts there is no escaping a theory of 
ontology; a theory of knowledge (epistemology) must have a presupposition about what the 
world is like (ontology) (Spencer 2000). In beginning to develop a framework Bhaskar’s 
epistemic fallacy is presented thus: 
Figure 4: Diagram representing Bhaskar’s epistemic fallacy 
 
 
This representation is intended to both make connections to the figures presented in part one 
and to highlight how a prioritisation of epistemology can lead to a smothering, or inattention 
to underlying ontology. This inattention, it is suggested, is a facet of current calls for 
education research to embrace ‘what works’, data rich practices. 
It is possible to give Bhaskar’s somewhat abstract statement of the epistemic fallacy more 
substance (and develop the framework advocated here) by considering a ‘history of ideas’ of 
what epistemological and ontological viewpoints have emerged over time in Western 
thought. The work of Collingwood offers such a conceptual overview that can illuminate the 





Collingwood is most famous for his posthumously published book The Idea of History 
(1946). Through The Idea of History Collingwood delineates a ‘tripartite’ division of history 
into the potentially uncontroversial categories of ancient, medieval and modern. Collingwood 
then suggests that each epoch of history had a different epistemology (or theory of 
knowledge) which he labels magic, religion and science. These epistemologies do not neatly 
match (begin and end) with each historical category; indeed an epistemology does not really 
come to an end, the progress of history is marked by increasingly complex interactions 
between rival epistemologies. As an epistemology of magic is superseded by the emergence 
of religion, human individuals do not all simultaneously renounce their magic beliefs; now 
there are at least two approaches to knowledge claims; a magical or a religious epistemology 
(or a combination of the two).  
To use the analogy of a map, there are now two alternative ways to ‘get around’; at least two 
ways to answer the epistemological question ‘what is knowledge and how is it possible?’ 
Both epistemologies make reference to significant (ontological) features and sources of 
evidence to ‘anchor’ their claims to truth. To continue the analogy, as ‘a map is not the 
territory’; so magic and religion are epistemology (differing maps) and not ontology (the 
territory it attempts to represent), the study of ‘what kinds of things exist’. In a later work 
Collingwood moves on to address the differing ontological assumptions that underlie the 
epistemological positions he has identified in Western thought. 
Through another posthumous work The Idea of Nature (1945) Collingwood turns his 
attention to historical conceptions of, or metaphors for, Nature with a capital ‘N’. It is 
important to notice this capitalization. Collinwood suggests the noun ‘nature’ has two 
common meanings, the first sense is of the essence or the inherent features, character, or 
qualities of something (it is in the nature of cats to chase birds). The second sense is of the 
phenomena of the physical world collectively, including plants, animals, the landscape, other 
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features and products of the earth, as opposed to human creations. Collingwood’s enquiry 
through the Idea of Nature is to delineate the ‘nature of nature’ (the essence of nature in the 
second sense above) thus ‘the idea of Nature’. These he terms the ancient Greek view of 
‘Nature as Organism’, the Renaissance view of ‘Nature as Machine’ and what he argues for 
as the Modern view of ‘Nature as History’. It is then, possible to develop the diagram of 
Bhaskar’s epistemic fallacy (above) through Collingwood’s work thus: 
 
Figure 5: Diagram representing Bhaskar’s epistemic fallacy developed by reference to the 
work of Collingwood 
 
Bhaskar  Collingwood 
 historical epoch 
= 
ancient medieval modern 
epistemology epistemology = magic religion science 
     
ontology ontology = Organism Machine History 
 Nature as …    
 
Again, Collingwood is not suggesting that these ontological metaphors of Nature neatly 
coincide with epistemological or historical epochs, but he is rather exploring the nuanced 
interaction between such ontological and epistemological positions. As a simple example, a 
mechanistic ontology of Nature (Nature as Machine) can be seen to increasingly dominate 
into the modern period, ‘transposing’ earlier organismic views until the role of God becomes 
that of a ‘divine watchmaker’ (commonly termed the ‘argument from design’). Under the 
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further pressure of epistemological developments into the era of modern science the 
mechanistic metaphor of Nature as a divinely created machine (the ‘watch of God’) comes 
instead to be viewed as a regular, predictable ‘machine’ subject to universal laws (the 
Newtonian ‘billiard ball universe’). The sense of Nature as Machine becomes literally 
‘disenchanted’, there is no place for the divine or spirit (an anima mundi) as the machine 
becomes increasingly knowable by and subject to the operation of human, scientific reason; 
the universal and general laws of theoria come to be the dominant epistemological outlook. 
The conception of a machine that animates this ontology of Nature as Machine itself changes 
over time as humans invent and experience different machines: clocks, steam engines, 
internal combustion engines and computers. 
To return to the framework above, in explaining his advocacy of ‘Nature as History’, 
Collingwood agues at the end of The Idea of Nature: 
 
I conclude that natural science as a form of thought exists and always has existed in a 
context of history, and depends upon historical thought for its existence. From this I 
venture to infer that no one can understand natural science unless [they] understands 
history; and no one can answer the question what Nature is unless [they] know what 
history is....that is why I answer the question, ‘Where do we go from here?’ by saying, 
‘We go from the idea of Nature to the idea of history.’ 
(Collingwood 1978, 177). 
 
It is perhaps unsurprising that an Oxford historian should have a high regard for History, 
however Collingwood’s intent here is significant. He is signalling an ‘ontological paradigm 
shift’; he is challenging the paradigm of Nature as Machine and the positivistic notion of 
nature itself. The Idea of Nature concludes with Collingwood asserting that we need to give 
up positivistic conceptions of ontology and move to a more temporal (changing over time, 
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dynamic and emergent) conception; a more interpretivist informed position that can issue in a 
conceptualist inspired more sophisticated realism.  
What is clear is that Collinwood is suggesting that the ontological metaphor of Nature as 
Machine is being superseded. While he terms the change in metaphor as the emergence of 
Nature as History (incorporating a rejection of positivism), it is also a call to recognise 
‘process’ and the dynamic nature of reality. Collingwood seems to be arguing that historical 
understanding is unlikely to be ‘born’ from ‘empirical hypotheses’ but requires an ongoing 
process and ontological engagement. This sense of process is of some utility as ‘Nature as 
Process’ contrasts with ‘Nature as Machine’ capturing something of the intellectual 
movements that precipitated the change. For instance, the impact of the concept of evolution 
drove Western thought from a view of Nature as fixed (with God as watchmaker perhaps) to 
a sense of a dynamic ecosystem, possessing reflexivity (or feedback processes characteristic 
of complexity theory and emergence) that ultimately influence and forge the nature of Nature 
through adaptation and survival of the fittest. This is perhaps a moment of re-enchantment, 
with the metaphor of Nature shifting from a lifeless (disenchanted) Machine to a ‘vital’, 
living, reflexive process; the reawakening of a more animate and emergent metaphor for 





Figure 6: Diagram representing Bhaskar’s epistemic fallacy developed by an amended 
reference to the work of Collingwood 
 
Bhaskar  Collingwood 
 historical epoch 
= 
ancient medieval modern 
epistemology epistemology = magic religion science 
     
ontology ontology = Organism Machine *Process 
 Nature as …    
* and italics marks amendment 
 
It is striking that Stark, through The Fundamental Forms of Social Thought (1962), argues for 
a similar historical development to that of Collingwood in his discussion of sociological 
perspectives on conceptions of the ‘nature of society’. Stark argues that views of society have 
progressed through what he terms a ‘deductive phase’ which focussed on opposing ‘unity’ 
and ‘multiplicity’ views of social formations (the problem of Universals interpreted through a 
sociological lens). It is Stark’s argument that collectivist, holistic and unitary views of 
society, that view social formations in a realist (ante res) sense have given way to atomistic, 
individualistic and multiplicity views of society, that view social formations in a nominalist 
(post res) sense. For Stark, realism and nominalism are sound, if one sided, philosophies. His 
task through The Fundamental Forms of Social Thought is not to decide between them but to 
reconcile the two; this is achieved by ‘winning’ a third mediating approach which sees 
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society more dynamically than either parent theory. In detailing this mediating approach, 
which Stark characterises as the ‘inductive phase’ of his thinking, he is inspired by the work 
of Dilthey. For Stark, Dilthey’s genius is his identification of three fundamental forms of 
thought which Dilthey terms ‘objective idealism’, ‘naturalism’ and ‘subjective idealism’. 
Stark extends Dilthey’s thought and in doing so renames the fundamental forms Organicism, 
Mechanicism and Process respectively. It is hoped that the kinship to Collingwood’s position 
is clear, with the final term at the ontological level being variously represented as history 
(Collingwood), subjective idealism (Dilthey) or process (Stark). 
For each fundamental form of thought Stark develops a detailed overview considering 
representative figures along a spectrum of ‘purity’ within each form. To offer a brief flavour 
of Stark’s thinking it is useful to briefly consider the ‘golden key’ and ‘key discipline’ that 
Stark proposes for each of the three forms. For the organic form of thought, the golden key is 
acquaintance with living organisms comprised of a material body and spiritual soul; this 
issues in pantheistic (and it might be asserted here in res, enchanted) views of society with 
biology as the key discipline. For the mechanistic form of thought, the golden key is 
acquaintance with inanimate and regular laws of physics; this issues in materialistic (ante res 
and disenchanted) views of society with physics as the key discipline. For the process form of 
thought, the golden key is acquaintance with moral conflict; this issues in a (post res) 
personalistic theistic view of society with history as the key discipline. The ‘winning’ of this 
mediating approach as a personalistic and processual ‘fundamental form’ of social thought 
might be illuminated by returning to Collingwood. 
Near the end of The Idea of Nature Collingwood characterises the break from preceding 
mechanistic ontological thought as the fading of the idea of ‘Nature at an instant,’ utilising a 




The older point of view [Nature as a machine] enables us to abstract from change and 
to conceive of the full reality of Nature at an instant, in abstraction from any temporal 
duration and characterised as to its interrelations solely by the instantaneous 
distribution of matter in space......For the modern view process, activity and change 
are the matter of fact. At an instant there is nothing. Each instant is only a way of 
grouping matters of fact. Thus, since there are no instants, conceived as simple 
primary entities, there is no Nature at an instant. (Nature and Life 1934, 47-8.) 
(Whitehead as cited in Collingwood 1978, 149) 
 
Collingwood is commenting on the fading of the grand narrative of Newtonian natural 
science. In the Newtonian paradigm, armed with the increased amassing of scientific theory 
(scientific epistemology) supported by an ontology of Nature as a Machine (subject to 
universal, regular, predictable laws) it was possible in principle, to attain a God like overview 
of reality; to have Nature at an instant. If the ontological metaphor of Nature as Machine is 
correct, then it is in principle possible to accurately predict all future states of Nature by the 
simple application of scientific laws. It is just this Newtonian faith in the ‘billiard ball’ 
universe that is challenged by the sense of Nature as Process. The Newtonian paradigm 
contains a mechanistically informed ‘standard operating procedure’ for rigorous scientific 
study. To understand reality conceived as Nature as Machine it is quite feasible to 
metaphorically stop the machine, disassemble it and examine its individual parts. However, 
this Newtonian paradigm has been superseded by the ‘winning’ of a different ontological 
viewpoint, a conceptualist view of Nature as History or Process. From this ontological 
perspective it is impossible to ‘stop the watch’ and examine the ‘Nature Machine’, Nature is 
inherently dynamic and intimately linked to its environment; it is inescapably animate. 
Nature as Process, like an ecosystem, is influenced by changes and feedback from within the 
system; increasingly Nature is viewed as possessing emergent properties. 
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In education research the ‘nature at an instant’ thinking that is implicit in calls for ‘what 
works’, data rich research based on the increased use of SR and RCTs is perhaps best 
captured by Malaguzzi’s hostility to what he terms ‘prophetic pedagogy’. Loris Malaguzzi 
the founder of the Reggio Emilia approach to education, began his teacher training in the 
immediate aftermath of the Second World War in Italy, initiating a grassroots approach to 
schooling - ‘people’s schools’ - that was suspicious of massed, centralised approaches to 
education. His war time experiences made him hostile to prophetic pedagogy which  
 
.. knows everything beforehand, knows everything that will happen, knows 
everything, does not have one uncertainty, is absolutely imperturbable. It 
contemplates everything and prophesies everything, sees everything, sees everything 
to the point that it is capable of giving you recipes for little bits of actions, minute by 
minute, hour by hour, objective by objective, five minutes by five minutes. This is 
something so coarse, so cowardly, so humiliating of teachers’ ingenuity, a complete 
humiliation for children’s ingenuity and potential. 
(Cagliari et al 2016, 98.92) 
 
Collingwood’s rejection of ‘nature at an instant’ is (in Bryman’s terms) the eschewing of the 
pretentions of natural science to discover the theoria of universal and general laws in both the 
natural and social sciences. Collingwood urges a rejection of ‘nature at an instant’ thinking 
based on a detailed engagement with the epistemological and ontological views that must be 
presumed to support such an outlook, the epistemology of natural sciences that draws on a 
realist and increasingly disenchanted view of Nature as Machine. In its place Collingwood 
argues for what he terms a more ‘historical’ ontology, in the terms of this chapter for Nature 
as Process. This ontological outlook is more amenable to a constructivist and nominalist 
conception of Nature, with knowledge making inescapably being interpretivist praxis, a 
process of continual creation in specific contexts. While Collingwood might be seen as 
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another combatant in the paradigm wars deploying synecdochic rhetoric (perhaps of a deeply 
considered philosophical variety) to the interpretivist and constructivist cause, his broad 
framework of analysis does facilitate a clearer consideration of Grosseteste’s comments on 
the anima mundi, understood in the more nuanced, conceptualist and emergent sense argued 
for in parts one and two, and the contemporary debate within education research. 
Part Four: Grosseteste’s sophisticated realism and future directions for contemporary 
education research 
Calls for contemporary education research to be more evidenced-based, and such research to 
discover ‘what works’ are contested. The current controversies can be placed in the context 
of the preceding paradigm wars in research. Though the characterisation of these debates as a 
paradigm war can be unhelpful, allowing ‘combatants’ to engage in synecdochic rhetoric, it is 
useful as a framework of analysis as it allows contemporary discourse in education research 
to be informed by broader philosophical debates such as that between theoria and praxis, the 
problem of universals and the disenchantment of Nature. Having a greater understanding of 
the ontological issues at stake makes it possible to attempt to move the contemporary 
discourse forward by reference to historical discussions, and suggested solutions to these 
perennial concerns. Grosseteste’s comments on the anima mundi, understood in a more 
nuanced way than an eventual rejection of cosmological animation is particularly useful in 
this regard. 
Both Grosseteste and some contemporary education researchers (such as Osberg and Biesta 
(2008, 2010)) seem unwilling to renounce a concept of Nature as Process; of Nature and 
research as vital, dynamic, emergent and particularist as opposed to being disenchanted, 
mechanistic and universalistic. The commitment is to the complexity of post res, 
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conceptualist research rather than the chimera offered by ‘what works’ approaches of ante 
res, prophetic education research. 
If Stevenson’s, Van Dyke’s and Cunningham’s interpretations of Grosseteste’s thought are 
accurate his unwillingness to decisively reject an anima mundi offers a route to develop 
contemporary discourse in education research. Grosseteste’s final bemoaning of his 
ignorance over the anima mundi chimes with those researchers and practitioners who are 
uneasy in taking up a more universalistic (theoria) approach to education research to inform 
their research focus or day-to-day classroom practice (praxis). Such a position can be 
subjected to synecdochic rhetoric from a positivistic and objectivist position 
 
I argue that current resistance to RCTs in education research cannot be explained 
according to a rational model […] the ‘resistors’ have simply not attended to the 
evidence that RCTs are practical, feasible, ethical and useful in yielding information 
to guide those who design, provide and use education services. The reasons for 
resistance can be understood in sociological terms, as conservative responses to real 
or imagined threats, including that of ‘new’ technology and its ability to reveal 
previously concealed features of academic work. Such responses can also be seen as 
moves to assert ideological positions and confirm academic status. 
(Oakley 2006, 64) 
 
Education research that eschews the scientific pretension and search for general and universal 
laws is not ‘relativistic’ but rather a sophisticated realism. A sophisticated realism that is 
committed to engage with knowledge in res, post res and ante res. There are attempts by 
some theorists of education research to apply an ontology of Nature as Process to the debate. 
For Biesta and Osberg this sense of Nature as Process is bound up with complexity theory 




Many educationalists have found complexity theory helpful for describing, 
characterising and understanding the dynamics of education differently, not in the 
least because the language of complexity makes it possible to see the non-linear, 
unpredictable and generative character of educational processes and practices in a 
positive light, focusing on the emergence of meaning, knowledge, understanding, the 
world and the self in and through education. 
(Biesta and Osberg 2010, 2) 
 
This then might be what an engagement with Grosseteste’s thinking contributes to the debate 
within education research, a more sophisticated realism than that offered by advocates of a 
‘what works’ research project; a research route that seems condemned by the terms of the 
discussion here, to be advocating capturing Nature at an instant through a surreptitious appeal 
to an outdated ontology of Nature as a Machine, when ‘[f]or the modern view process, 
activity and change are the matter of fact’. What is in fact required is an ontology of Nature 
as Process allied to an emergentist epistemology; knowledge that emerges dynamically in a 
conceptualist fashion; simultaneously in res, ante res and post res.  
Within current education policy making and research, the framework and discussion offered 
here should raise some concerns amongst the advocates of a ‘what works’ approach. The 
intention is not to add more synecdochic rhetoric to the debate (a ‘what works’ methodology 
of RCTs increasingly bolstered by SR can unquestionably reveal important insights), 
however such an approach will necessarily always have very limited predictive power, as 
‘nature at an instant’ is ‘overtaking’ by the emergent praxis of lived reality. This statement is 
not a ‘resistance to new technologies’ (Oakley 2006) but rather a rigorously scientific 
position. Those sceptical of the calls to adopt rigorously scientific approaches to educational 
research are justified in their scepticism when the calls are made by fellow researchers who 
either unreflexively commit the epistemic fallacy of ignoring ontology altogether (renaming 
Nature at an instant as ‘what works’), or make surreptitious or unconscious appeal to an 
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ontology of Nature as Machine to interpret their findings as objective and scalable (applicable 
to all situations). Some of these concerns are voiced by researchers in the field, most notably 
Biesta (2007), Hammersley (2005), Higgins (2014) and Wiliams (2016) who question the 
increasing dominance of cognitivist informed research advocated by a recent education 
secretary (Gove 2014).  
It is the ante res presumptions of prophetic pedagogy and ‘what works’ education research 
that an engagement with Grosseteste’s comments on the anima mundi can illuminate, lighting 
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